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Abstract
“[Y]our tranny looking dad is a disgrace to American football,” “I would rape the shit out of her,” and “[The]
[B]ears are easier than you on prom night,” are just a sampling of some of the alarmingly harassing tweets
received by Chloe Trestman between the night of November 9, 2014 and November 10, 2014. Who is
Chloe Trestman, and what could she have possibly done to warrant such abuse? Chloe’s father is Marc
Trestman, the head coach of the Chicago Bears. And the twitter vitriol, or “twitriol,” directed toward Chloe
was in response to the Bears’ blowout loss to their longtime rivals, the Green Bay Packers, 55-14 on
Sunday Night Football. So the question remains, what did Chloe do to garner such an abusive reaction
from the disgruntled Chicago fan-base?
The answer, of course, is she did nothing to deserve this hate-inspired tweeter tirade, other than being the
daughter of an NFL head coach and having a twitter account. In this generation of Facebook, Twitter and
other social media outlets, it is commonplace for athletes, and unfortunately sometimes their family
members, to become targets of harassing online misconduct and abuse. Arguably more alarming than
the harassing component of social media websites, is the fact that the current laws governing Internet
Service Providers lack the necessary teeth to provide any recourse to athletes victimized by online
misconduct, which only perpetuates this type of behavior and leaves no recourse for the injured party. So
Coach Trestman, Chloe Trestman and mostly any other internet targeted athlete are left with no legal
remedy until the vast safeguards protecting ISPs are curtailed.
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Abstract
“[Y]our tranny looking dad is a disgrace to American football,” “I would rape
the shit out of her,” and “[The] [B]ears are easier than you on prom night,”1 are just
a sampling of some of the alarmingly harassing tweets received by Chloe Trestman
between the night of November 9, 2014 and November 10, 2014. Who is Chloe
Trestman, and what could she have possibly done to warrant such abuse? Chloe’s
father is Marc Trestman, the head coach of the Chicago Bears. And the twitter
vitriol, or “twitriol,” directed toward Chloe was in response to the Bears’ blowout
loss to their longtime rivals, the Green Bay Packers, 55-14 on Sunday Night
Football. So the question remains, what did Chloe do to garner such an abusive
reaction from the disgruntled Chicago fan-base?
The answer, of course, is she did nothing to deserve this hate-inspired
tweeter tirade, other than being the daughter of an NFL head coach and having a
twitter account. In this generation of Facebook, Twitter and other social media
outlets, it is commonplace for athletes, and unfortunately sometimes their family
members, to become targets of harassing online misconduct and abuse. Arguably
more alarming than the harassing component of social media websites, is the fact
that the current laws governing Internet Service Providers lack the necessary teeth
to provide any recourse to athletes victimized by online misconduct, which only
perpetuates this type of behavior and leaves no recourse for the injured party. So
Coach Trestman, Chloe Trestman and mostly any other internet targeted athlete
are left with no legal remedy until the vast safeguards protecting ISPs are
curtailed.

Samer Kalaf, Twitter Users Harass Marc Trestman's Daughters After Bears Loss, Deadspin (Nov.
10, 2014), http://deadspin.com/twitter-users-harass-marc-trestmans-daughters-after-bea1657009542.
1
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“The fact that broadcasters, media people and athletes are allowed to
tweet, which should be against the law, is a big change, okay. It should
be against the law, all right, because nobody needs to hear from any
one of them.”2
– Mike Francesa

Tom Weir, WFAN's Mike Francesa Wants to Make Twitter Illegal, USA TODAY (May 15, 2012),
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/gameon/post/2012/05/wfans-mike-francesa-wants-to-maketwitter-illegal/1#.UXhmTrVJOVV.
2
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Legendary New York sports radio talk show host Mike Francesa is right in
that athletic tweets can be problematic. Due to their celebrity status, athletes are
easy targets for social media “trolls,” or people who regularly and anonymously post
offensive insults on social media sites.3 While some of the negative content
constitutes free speech, there are many instances when the third party’s conduct
exceeds the First Amendment’s scope of protection, and quite often constitutes cyber
harassment.4
Few, if any, laws provide athletes with meaningful recourse. Under the
current law, individual social media sites and other Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) are immune from liability for their users’ behavior by the legislative
safeguards granted to ISPs through the Communications Decency Act (CDA) and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).5 As recent incidents illustrate, the
consequences of athletic cyber harassment yield great damages.6
The consequence of damages is complicated by the anonymous nature of
social media and the strong business presence of the sports industry in the United
States and throughout the world. This makes athletes some of the most popular and
influential people in the country, which renders them vulnerable targets for
Internet misconduct by way of social media sites. Society’s iconography of athletes
increases the potential for damages resulting from public humiliation via social
media. According to a recent article by Lee Gordon, the Barna Group reports that,
“Americans believe that professional athletes have a bigger influence on their lives
than pastors by more than a three-to-one margin.”7 Just consider the 20.5 million
Twitter followers of LeBron James to the 5.9 million followers of Pope Francis.8
The combination of America’s infatuation with athletes and ease of fanathlete communication on social media can be volatile. Despite every effort that is
made to limit athletes’ use of social media to avoid precarious situations that will
reflect poorly on the athlete and the team, league or university, athletes still find
themselves frequently in trouble due to their availability to the public on such sites
Erik Brady & Jorge L. Ortiz, For Athletes, Social Media Not All Fun and Games, USA TODAY (July
31, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2013/07/31/for-athletes-social-media-not-all-funand-games/2606829/.
4 Id. (example of how tennis professional and “U.S. Fed Cup team member Varvara Lepchenko found
a message on her Facebook page at Wimbledon telling her that if she didn't lose her first-round
match in London she wouldn't live”).
5 Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. §
512 (2012).
6 See infra Part I (the Manti Te’o and Randall Goforth situations discussed within this article).
7 Lee Gordon, Think Before You Tweet: Social Media Lessons for Athletes, STACK (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://www.stack.com/2013/02/22/twitter-for-athletes.
8 @KingJames, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/KingJames (last visited April 19, 2015); @Pontifex,
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Pontifex/followers (last visited April 19, 2015).
3
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as Facebook and Twitter. Under the current set of laws, there is no remedy for
athletes victimized through social media misconduct.
This article will highlight the vulnerability of national athletes through their
use of social media and will discuss the lack of remedies available due to the
legislative and judicial confines of Free Speech and the current applicable laws. The
article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a narrative of two recent social media
debacles: the Manti Te’o catfishing controversy and the Randall Goforth fake
Twitter account prank. This section uses the Te’o and Goforth situations to
illustrate how high profile athletes can become victims of Internet misconduct
through the use of social media.
Part II outlines the current safeguards that prevent Te’o, Goforth and other
similarly situated athletes from recovering damages suffered through social media
sites or other ISPs. Specifically, this section will address the immunities granted to
ISPs through the CDA, the DMCA, and explain how the Supreme Court and other
federal courts have expanded Congressional immunity granted to ISPs.
Part III analyzes the cyber harassment aspect of these two incidents, while
Part IV describes the collective limitations of the CDA, the DMCA, and the current
harassment laws as means to provide relief for online harassment. This last section
illustrates the reason Te’o and Goforth are likely to fail should they proceed with
their actions against Facebook and Twitter, respectively. This article concludes by
arguing that the current laws do not offer adequate relief for Te’o, Goforth and other
similarly situated athletes. In fact, these laws actually contribute to social media
misconduct by immunizing social media sites from repercussions from this type of
conduct.
I. OPENING DRIVE: SOCIAL MEDIA’S NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ATHLETES
Both the Manti Te’o fake girlfriend hoax, which broke in early January 2013,
and the Randall Goforth fake Twitter account incident, which occurred at the end of
the 2012 NCAA football season, illustrate how social media sites can make athletes,
through little or no fault of their own, easy targets for harmful online activity.
Although the specific details differ, both cases share the important similarities of
garnering an incredible amount of media coverage and displaying the dangerous
side of social media for athletes. Both instances serve as examples that support the
need for accountability of ISPs when social media leads to emotional injury, loss of
anticipated business, and other possible damages.
A. (Cat)fishing for Manti
Manti Te’o at 6’5” and 250lbs, was Notre Dame’s All-American inside
linebacker who played in all 38 games during his four-year career and started in 36
36
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of them, including 35 consecutive contests for the Fighting Irish.9 Te’o was one of
the most highly regarded and most decorated defensive players, not only to come
out of Notre Dame in recent years, but in college football history.10 Prior to January
2013, his name was synonymous with winning, strong character, leadership, and
potential.
Te’o’s journey was one of the feel-good college stories emerging out of the
2012 season. His exceptional play anchored the revitalized Notre Dame defense that
paced the Fighting Irish to a 12-0 record, which earned the storied university a spot
in the 2013 Bowl Championship Series title game to compete for its first National
Championship since 1988.11 He was heralded for how well he was able to perform
on the field after losing both his grandmother and his girlfriend, Lennay Kekua,
who lost a battle to leukemia, within hours of each other during the season in
September 2012.12 Te’o’s stellar play, coupled with his tragic personal loss,
propelled him into the running for the Heisman Trophy, which is awarded by a vote
to the most outstanding college player of the season. Although Te’o would finish
second in the Heisman Trophy balloting, his professional career appeared to be
bright as he was considered a highly touted prospect coming out of college and
believed to be a high first round draft selection in the upcoming 2013 NFL Draft.13
Te’o’s personal and professional life were both compromised, however, when the
website Deadspin published an article stating that his late girlfriend never
existed.14
Notre Dame claimed in a statement that Te’o was a victim of an elaborate
“hoax,” known as catfishing,15 in which someone used the fictitious name Lennay
Kekua in order to establish a relationship with him and later conspired with others
to convince Te’o that she had tragically died of leukemia.16 Te’o released a
Manti Te’o, THE OFFICIAL SITE OF NOTRE DAME’S ATHLETICS: FOOTBALL,
http://www.und.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/teo_manti00.html (last visited May 2, 2013).
10 Id.
11 Manti Te’o-Biography, THE BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/manti-teo21105315?page=1 (last visited May 2, 2012) (hereinafter “Manti Te’o-Biography”).
12 Steve Eder, Hoax Is Revealed as Irish Star Says He Was Duped, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/sports/ncaafootball/story-of-manti-teos-girlfriend-is-said-to-be-ahoax.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1367524036-s7Qzmj65fhVnlshsZd8BNA.
13 Manti Te’o-Biography, supra note 11; see Matt Hayes, BCS National Championship Game:
Alabama vs. Notre Dame Analysis, SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/story/2012-12-14/bcs-national-championship-game-2013alabama-vs-notre-dame-nick-saban.
14 Eder, Hoax, supra note 12.
15 See generally Mary Pilon, In Te’o Story, Deception Ripped from the Screen, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/sports/ncaafootball/deception-ripped-from-the-screen-inhoax-story-of-manti-teo.html?_r=0
(explaining the origins of the “catfishing” phenomenon).
16 Eder, Hoax, supra note 12.
9
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statement of his own, admitting that he was the target of “what was apparently
someone’s sick joke and constant lies.”17 But as more facts became public, the more
twisted the story became, lending credence to what many media outlets’ labeled as,
“one of the most bizarre stories to surface in the sports world in a long time.”18
Despite the claims from Te’o and Notre Dame that depicted him as nothing
more than a sympathetic victim in this peculiar story, some of the facts have left
many questioning if he was a willing participant in this fraud, hoping that the
tragic story would garner sympathy from the public and voters alike, in an effort to
bolster his resume for the Heisman Trophy.19 On December 8, 2012 (two days after
receiving the chilling call from Kekua’s phone, which left him questioning her death
and identity), at the Heisman Trophy ceremony, Te’o stated that the most
unforgettable moment of the 2012 season was the moment he found out his
girlfriend had died.20 Although he has maintained his innocence in the hoax, Te’o
did admit during his interview with ESPN that he tailored the story to lead people
to believe that he had actually met Kekua in person before her death, out of
embarrassment of people knowing it was strictly an online relationship.21
From the time the rumblings surrounding the hoax began to surface at the
end of December 2012, a downward spiral was set in motion for Te’o’s professional
career.22 He had a poor performance in the BCS National Championship Game in
early January 201323 and was later underwhelming at the 2013 NFL combine in
Indianapolis.24 His misfortune continued in April 2013 when he was selected with

Eder, Hoax, supra note 12.
Manti Te’o-Biography, supra note 11.
19 Steve Eder, Image Becomes a Puzzle as Theories on Te’o Swirl, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/sports/ncaafootball/image-of-manti-teo-becomes-puzzle-astheories-swirl.html?pagewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As.
20 Eder, Te’o Answers Questions but Doesn’t Settle Riddle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/sports/ncaafootball/teos-espn-interview-has-answers-but-doesntsettle-riddle.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3As&_r=0.
21 Id.
22 Eder, Te’o Answers, supra note 20.
23 Tim Rohan, Te’o’s Draft Stock Tumbled When Irish Did, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/sports/ncaafootball/manti-teos-draft-stock-tumbled-when-irishdid.html.
24 Mike Florio, Te’o Blames Slow 40 Time on Combine Stress, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Feb. 25, 2013,
9:21 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/02/25/teo-blames-slow-40-time-on-combine-stress
(Te'o ran a 4.82-second 40-yard dash at the NFL scouting, which is considered slow for an NFL
linebacker).
17
18
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the thirty-eighth pick, the sixth pick of the second round and the third linebacker
taken overall, in the 2013 NFL Draft.25
Te’o, who entered the 2013 championship game as a highly regarded first
round draft pick talent, dropped to the second round after his poor performance in
the championship game and his sub-par forty time. Two team officials from
different NFL clubs expressed to ESPN after the draft that their respective teams
passed up on Te’o due to his “off the field issues” as well.26 It appears as though the
fake girlfriend hoax not only embarrassed Te’o on a national level and tarnished his
reputation, but it may have cost him the prestige and money that accompany a first
round draft pick. Even Te’o was quoted as saying that he expected himself to be a
first round draft pick, but he realized that “things happened” and vowed that his
misfortunes would only give him more motivation going forward.27 The damage to
Te’o’s reputation and professional career has already been done.
B. Will @TheRealRandallGoforth Please Tweet Back?
Although far less convoluted than the Manti Te’o saga, Randall Goforth’s
situation was no less serious. Sometime in late October 2012, it appeared as though,
innocently enough, Randall Goforth, University of California, Los Angeles’ (UCLA)
then Freshmen punt returner and defensive back, set up a Twitter account under
the handle @RandallG3000.28 The problem was that it was not Goforth at all, but an
unknown perpetrator.29 And it did not take long for this undercover prankster to
heat up the already deep seeded football rivalry between UCLA and University of
Southern California (USC) sending both fan bases and players alike into a twitter
frenzy.
While the Twitter war raged on between the two college football
powerhouses, the actual Randall Goforth was left completely in the dark because,
according to Coach Jim Mora, Goforth was in a tutoring session when the “idiot”
was out there tweeting.30 At the time of the incident, Goforth himself did not even
have a Twitter account and he later informed the Los Angeles Times that he would

Chargers Draft LB Manti Te'o, ESPN.COM NEWS (April 27, 2013),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/draft2013/story/_/id/9215985/2013-nfl-draft-san-diego-chargers-select-mantiteo-sixth-pick-second-round.
26 Id.
27 Chargers Draft, supra note 25.
28 Paul Myerberg, Fake Twitter Account has UCLA's Jim Mora Steaming Mad, USA Tᴏᴅᴀʏ (Nov. 6,
2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/gameon/2012/11/06/jim-mora-ucla-fake-twitter/1687763/.
29Id.
30 Id.
25
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not dare talk like that as a freshmen.31 Whatever Goforth would not say, however,
@RandallG3000 had no problem tweeting. On November 5, 2012, the imposter
infuriated the Trojan fan base, including some members of the USC football squad,
when he boisterously tweeted, “[W]e will beat you guys on Nov. 17. Believe the
hype.”32 After a series of exchanges between USC fans and @RandallG3000, the
fake Goforth further enraged the USC faithful by claiming, “USC SUCKS!! WE
WILL GET IT IN NOVEMBER 17. ALL ABOUT ACTION NO NEED TO BRAG
JUST BE TUNED IN ON THE 17TH!!!!”33
Quickly, the real Goforth’s UCLA teammates came to his defense alerting the
Twitter community that this was someone impersonating Goforth and nothing
more.34 The backlash even prompted Mora to contact then USC head coach Lane
Kiffin to explain that this was just a hoax.35 Mora was visibly livid when he spoke to
the media about the whole situation, noting that the “[p]ower of social media is
amazing and when it's used in a negative way like that, it's sickening.”36 He labeled
the imposter a “coward” and challenged whomever it was to reveal his true identity,
but Mora noted this would never happen because “[t]hat’s what cowards do.
Cowards hide behind print…”37
Mora, however, continued in his criticism of the Goforth impersonator
claiming that this individual was “the lowest form of life form if you would portray
yourself as an 18-year-old young man who's out here trying to do his best…I think
he ought to go to jail. That's how I feel. I think you're a scumbag."38 Although
Mora’s comments were rife with emotion, he does unearth a serious problem
associated with the type of social media behavior experienced by Goforth, which is
the near impossible task of discovering who should be held accountable for Goforth’s
harm when the actual attacker remains anonymous. Unfortunately for Goforth, due
to the current structure of our laws, Twitter would remain free from liability despite
the fact that it was the vehicle chosen to perpetrate the unauthorized online
impersonation - essentially offering no remedy to Goforth.
The circumstances surrounding Te’o and Goforth are uniquely different, but
the natures of the indiscretions are the same. Both men were targeted because of
their high profile statuses as NCAA college football players for major programs at
Ron Dicker, Randall Goforth Impersonator Starts Twitter War Between USC, UCLA, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/randall-goforthimpersonator-twitter-usc-ucla-mora_n_2088357.html.
32 Myerberg, supra note 28.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Dicker, supra note 31.
36 Myerberg, supra note 28.
37 Id.
38 Myerberg, supra note 28.
31
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Notre Dame and UCLA, and social media provided the platform allowing these
athletes to be easily perpetrated. Only compounding the problem for Te’o and
Goforth (and other similarly situated athletes) is the fact that any attempt at legal
recourse against the ISPs in question, will likely be a futile exercise under today’s
Internet regulations and laws to online activity. This is alarming because not only
are ISPs protected from liability for their users’ tortious conduct, but also there is
no deterrent for similar misconduct in the future under the current governing laws.
II. PROTECTING THE QUARTERBACK: ISP SAFEGUARDS AND THEIR IMMUNITY FROM
TORTIOUS INTERNET ACTIVITY
Congress has protected ISPs by providing immunity from defamatory or tortious
material published by their users through the CDA and the DMCA. Congress
determined that holding ISPs liable for legal issues created by their subscribers was
not in the public’s best interest39 and passed the CDA and the DMCA in an effort to
protect the ISPs from liability.40 These acts render ISPs immune from tort-based
claims stemming from a third party’s activity.41 ISP immunity from tortious conduct
has only been expanded through the case law governing the CDA and DMCA.
A. The Two Blocks of Granite: Legislative Safeguards
This section will discuss both the CDA and the DMCA in depth. It will then
explain how the higher courts, through precedent; have expanded the already broad
ISP safeguards. The combined ramifications of the Acts, along with the case law,
renders ISPs nearly invincible to litigation arising from the conduct of their users.
i.

The Communications Decency Act

Congress enacted the CDA in 1996, which paved the way for the preferential
treatment afforded to ISPs in regards to user liability.42 At the heart of the Act is
Section 230, which offers ISPs immunity from third party liability.43 Section
230(c)(1) of the CDA establishes a general standard in regard to all ISPs providing
that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”44 The Act defines an “information content provider” as a “person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
Cyrus Sarosh Jan Manekshaw, Liability of Isps: Immunity from Liability Under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and the Communications Decency Act, 10 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J.
101, 102 (2005).
40 Id. at 102.
41 Id. at 109.
42 Id. at 106.
43 47 U.S.C. § 230.
44 Id.
39

41
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service.”45 Whereas Section 230(f)(2) defines an “interactive computer service” as
any interactive service system or provider that “enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educations institutions."46
The distinction between an “interactive computer service” and an “information
content provider” is a crucial one under Section 230(c)(1), as any ISP labeled an
“interactive computer service” is free from liability for another’s content.47 Courts
have referred to Section 230(c)(2), specifically, as the “Good Samaritan” provision of
the CDA, despite the whole (c) subsection being entitled "Protection for 'Good
Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material."48 The “Good Samaritan”
provision, Section 230(c)(2)(A), specifically limits civil liability for any provider or
user of interactive computer service on account of “[a]ny action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.”49
Congress made sure to address the issue of preemption in Section 230(e)(3) of
the CDA in an effort to curtail the challenge-ability of the Act. This Section declares
that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”50 Despite the wide-ranging
immunity bestowed upon ISPs through Section 230, it is important to note that the
CDA is not absolute.51
Section 230(e), which discusses the effect the Act has on other laws, highlights
the act’s weakness.52 According to Section 230(e)(1): “Nothing in this section shall be
construed to impair the enforcement of” specific laws pertaining to obscenity or
relating to the sexual exploitation of children or “any other Federal criminal
statute.”53 Through its language this Section also appears to exempt intellectual

47 U.S.C. § 230.
Id.
47 Id.
48 See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Immunity
Provisions of Communications Decency Act, 52 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 37 (2011).
49 47 U.S.C. § 230
50 47 U.S.C. § 230
51 Manekshaw, supra note 39, at 108.
52 47 U.S.C. § 230.
53 Id.
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property from the CDA since “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” 54
The courts seem to struggle with interpreting the application of the limitation
involving intellectual property law.55 Depending on the circumstances of the case,
courts have been split when deciding if the limitation did or did not apply to claims
arising under state and federal law.56 Despite the intellectual property limitation to
the Act, it is evident that Congress’ intent, which has been expounded by the case
law, was to restrict government interference and to extend immunity from liability
to ISPs for third party activity.57
Another peculiarity of the CDA is located in Section 230(b), which discusses the
policy concerns of the Act. Section 230(b)(5) proclaims that it is the United States’
policy to “ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.” 58 If this
was truly a priority for Congress, then it seems almost counterproductive to grant
such indiscriminate and extensive immunity to all ISPs who can meet the
requirements to be labeled as an interactive computer service. However, instead of
limiting Section 230’s safeguard protections, Congress only further broadened the
immunity enjoyed by ISPs by virtue of the DMCA.
ii.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act

The DMCA improved the shortcomings of the CDA while making the immunity
power enjoyed by ISPs even more expansive. Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, amid much controversy, with the purpose of
adapting copyright law to the digital age.59 The Act consists of two crucial, and
sometimes conflicting, goals: “promoting the continued growth and development of
electronic commerce and protecting intellectual property rights.”60
Section 512 of the DMCA offers ISPs a “safe harbor” or immunity from liability
stemming from claims of copyright infringement,61 an area that was left vulnerable
under Section 230 of the CDA.62 Section 512(b)(1) limits service providers’ liability
for copyright infringement “by reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of
47 U.S.C. § 230.
Catalano, supra note 48.
56 Id.
57 Manekshaw, supra note 39, at 114.
58 47 U.S.C. § 230.
59 Amy P. Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 179 A.L.R. Fed. 319 (2002).
60 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23 (1998).
61 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
62 Jillian Bluestone, La Russa's Loophole: Trademark Infringement Lawsuits and Social Networks,
17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 573, 581 (2010).
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material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider.”63 The infringing material must: 1) be made available online by someone
other than the service provider; 2) be transmitted by that person to a third person
via the service provider’s network; and 3) be stored and transmitted through “an
automatic technical process for the purpose of making the material available to
users of the system or network” who can request to access the material from the
person who made it available online.64
The DMCA does not provide blanket immunity to all ISPs for infringing material
posted on their networks, but rather qualifies only certain providers when specific
conditions are met.65 In order for a provider to qualify for a Section 512 safe harbor,
the provider must:
(a)[Adopt] and reasonably [implement], and [inform] subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy
that provides for termination in appropriate circumstances of
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
network who are repeat infringers; and (b)[accommodate] and does not
interfere with standard technical measures.66
Even though the DMCA allows for the service providers to follow these
guidelines reasonably, as opposed to strictly, there are limitations for the safe
harbor provision of the Act.67 An ISP can lose its safe harbor protection when it has
actual knowledge or should have had constructive knowledge of the infringement.68
The safe harbor can also be limited when a service provider, upon obtaining an
infringing activity, does not “[act] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material.”69 Therefore, in order for an ISP to enjoy the safe harbor provided by the
DMCA, the service provider must advertise a policy against copyright infringements
and make a realistic threat of shutting down account access to those who go against
the policy.70
B. The Expansion of the CDA and the DMCA Through the Courts
Through their interpretations of the CDA and the DMCA, the federal courts
have broadened the Act’s already far-reaching authority to the point where it
appears as though there is no remedy available for a victim of social media
17 U.S.C. § 512.
Id.
65 17 U.S.C. § 512.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 17 U.S.C. § 512.
70 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582.
63
64

44

PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. VOL. 5, ISS. 1 (2015)
Wide Right:
How ISP Immunity and Current Laws Are Off the Mark in
Protecting the Modern Athlete on Social Media
misconduct. It is evident that at the time, the federal courts chose to protect ISPs
from user misconduct as opposed to holding them accountable for such actions on
their Internet platforms. The cases that followed resulted in the pivotal precedent
that has shaped the landscape of ISP immunity as it is today.
The landmark case of Zeran v. America Online tested the immunity power of
Section 230 of the CDA.71 In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit held that the CDA barred
the plaintiff’s liability claims against AOL alleging that the company “unreasonably
delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third party,
refused to post retractions of those messages, and failed to screen for similar
postings thereafter.”72 The court emphasized that Congress’ intent for Section 230
was to restrict governmental interference and allow the Internet to police itself. 73
The Fourth Circuit continued to interpret Congressional intent in Zeran by
finding that the purpose behind statutory immunity was “not difficult to discern,”
and that Congress made a “policy choice” not to “deter harmful online speech
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as
intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages.”74 This case was
decided in 1997 and the court then acknowledged that an ISP such as AOL was
dealing with users in the millions and the amount of information communicated via
interactive computer services was staggering.75 According to the Fourth Circuit,
Congress believed that if ISPs were faced with liability claims for each message
republished by their services, the service providers would be forced to restrict the
number of users and messages posted, which would have a “chilling effect” on the
freedom of internet speech.76 As a result, Congress chose to immunize ISPs to avoid
such a restrictive result.77
In the 1998 case of Blumenthal v. Drudge, the D.C. Circuit expanded on the
immunities provided to ISPs via the CDA and the Zeran decision.78 The
Blumenthals, a husband and wife, were White House Employees who brought a
defamation action against defendant, Matt Drudge, an online columnist, and AOL
for disseminating the defamatory content.79 AOL had entered into a one year
licensing agreement with Drudge making the Drudge Report available to all AOL
members in exchange for a $3,000 monthly “royalty payment” to Drudge.80 Under
Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582.
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc. 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
73 Id.. at 327, 330.
74 Id. at 330-31.
75 Id. at 331.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582.
79 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D.D.C. 1998).
80 Id. at 47.
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the agreement, Drudge was able to “create, edit, update and ‘otherwise manage’ the
content of the Drudge Report” while AOL maintained the right to remove content
that it “reasonably determined” was in violation of AOL's then standard terms of
service.81
In formulating its decision, the D.C. Circuit used the principals outlined in
Zeran to begrudgingly conclude that AOL was immune from suit in this case despite
the fact that Drudge was an AOL employee and was operating in his employment
capacity.82 This ruling was a display of great deference to the Zeran decision since
the D.C. Circuit ruled in this manner even though the court believed that AOL had
taken “advantage of all the benefits conferred by Congress in the Communications
Decency Act, and then some, without accepting any of the burdens that Congress
intended.”83 Blumenthal would be only one of several cases to site Zeran as
authority, which reaffirmed the findings of the Zeran court. 84
In 2001, the Southern District of New York decided Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall &
Assoc., in which Gucci brought a trademark infringement claim against a website
operator and the ISP which was hosting the operator’s website.85 Here, the court
affirmed that the CDA does not provide immunity for trademark infringement
claims against ISPs.86 The impact of this decision gave rise to several claims that
triggered DMCA safe harbor protection.87
The first notable case in this category was Hendrickson v. eBay, which was
decided in 2001.88 The plaintiff was the owner of a copyright in a motion picture and
brought this infringement action against eBay, the online auction service, which
had listed offers to sell the alleged infringing copies of the film.89 The court applied
a narrow interpretation of the DMCA in determining whether an ISP qualified for
safe harbor protection and found that a service provider cannot lose its immunity
when it engages in conduct specifically required by the DMCA.90
The conduct specifically required by the DMCA at issue in Hendrickson is the
requirement for an ISP to remove or block access to materials posted on its system
once it has been notified of a claimed infringement.91 Upon receiving notice of the
Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 47.
Id. at 51-52.
83 Id. at 52-53.
84 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582-83.
85 Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
86 Id. at 417.
87 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 583.
88 Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
89 Id. at 1084-85.
90 Id. at 1093.
91 Id.
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infringement claim by the plaintiff, eBay removed the infringing listings of the
movie pursuant to the DMCA.92 Thus, it was meritless to argue that by removing
the infringed material that eBay had established the right and ability to control the
infringing activity on its website.93 Furthermore, the court found that a notice of
infringement to a service provider such as eBay must “comply substantially” with
the elements of notification of the DMCA in order to remove safe harbor protection,
which was not achieved in Hendrickson.94
In Costar Group v. Loopnet, the court further expanded the DMCA
interpretations of safe harbor immunity for service providers claiming that the
DMCA created a floor, but not a ceiling, for ISP protection.95 The District Court of
Maryland held that an ISP’s “policy must warn users who repeatedly infringe
copyrights that there is a ‘realistic threat’ of losing account access.”96 Then in 2008,
the Fifth Circuit continued the trend of extending CDA and DMCA immunities to
include social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter in Doe v. MySpace.97
Based on the immunity from liability provided to ISPs through the CDA and the
DMCA and the broadening effect of these Acts via court interpretation, it seems
unlikely that any service provider could be found liable for a tort committed by one
of their users’ acts.98 However, many times the damaging online behavior
necessitates some type of remedy. In these situations, it is common for these victims
to turn to harassment statutes to find justice for their Internet grievances.
III. INCOMPLETE PASS: HARASSMENT LAWS ILLUSTRATE HOW TRADITIONAL LAWS DO
NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS ISP MISCONDUCT
Harassment laws have progressed through the years in effort to adapt to our
ever-evolving society, except when it comes to cyber harassment. Harassment, in its
traditional offline form, is defined as “words, conduct, or action ... that ... annoys,
alarms, or causes substantial emotional stress in [the] person and serves no
legitimate purpose.”99 The Internet has muddled the traditional notions of
harassment by providing increased opportunities for harassers who can
anonymously perpetrate their victims with ease through email, blogs, or social
media sites while at home or at work.100 As a result, there is no universal definition
Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
Id.
94 Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
95 Costar Group v. Loopnet, 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004).
96 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 584.
97 Id.; see, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
98 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328; Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at1082; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 47;
Gucci Am., Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
99 Sarah Jameson, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech and Privacy, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS, 231, 235 (2008).
100 Jameson, supra note 99, at 235.
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for cyber harassment, but it typically occurs “when an individual or group with no
legitimate purpose uses a form of electronic communication as a means to cause
great emotional distress to a person.”101 A cyberharasser’s motive is to frighten or
embarrass the victim.102
Unfortunately, Congress has not made protecting victims of cyberharassment a
priority.103 As a result, there is currently no federal statute that directly addresses
the various forms of cyberharassment, which means victims must rely on the
traditional federal harassment laws and possibly state laws.104 Harassment is
usually classified as a misdemeanor in most states, but these statutes have no
applicable law or punishment for violators on the Internet.105
Initially, Section 223 of the CDA made it a federal crime to use a
telecommunications device to make harassing or obscene calls, but the Internet was
intentionally excluded from the statute for years.106 Then, in 2006, Section
223(a)(1)(C) was amended to incorporate into its definition of “telecommunications
device,” “any device or software that can be used to originate telecommunications or
other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by the
Internet.”107 After the 2006 amendment, Section 223(a)(1)(C) made it a federal
crime for anyone using the Internet "without disclosing his identity and with intent
to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person…who receives the
communications.”108 Thus, Internet harassment was finally criminalized pursuant
to the 2006 amendment.
Based on their most recent amendments, the traditional federal statutes
addressing harassment are trying to incorporate the online nature of the crime as
Jameson, supra note 99, at 237 (“Until Congress adopts a federal statute, the need for clearly
stated definitions remains.”).
102 Jameson, supra note 99, at 236.
103 Jameson, supra note 99, at 245-46 (“Traditional, federal harassment statutes focus on physical
contact between the harasser and the victim and therefore inappropriately address the virtual
nature of cyberharassment. Although Congress has enacted legislation to protect children on the
Internet, mainly from harmful content, enacting legislation to protect victims from harassers on the
Internet has not been a congressional priority. Victims of cyberharassment are limited to civil
litigation as a remedy: victims can sue for defamation, invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Victims might also find recourse by reporting a cyberharasser to an ISP and then
attempting to sue the ISP itself under section 509 of the CDA. However, when utilized in suits for
unlawful conduct over the Internet, these options are increasingly restricted and leave victims of
cyberharassment ineffectively protected. Fortunately, Congress has started to recognize the
increasing problems caused by cyberharassment.”).
104 2 RONALD N. WEIKERS ET AL., , Dᴀᴛᴀ Sᴇᴄᴜʀɪᴛʏ ᴀɴᴅ Pʀɪᴠᴀᴄʏ Lᴀᴡ § 15:18 (2d ed. 2014).
105 Jameson, supra note 99, at 246.
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evidenced by Section 223(a)(1)(C). However, issues with applying them to
cyberharassment still remain. The fundamental problem in applying such laws to
cyberharassment is due to the traditional statute’s strong focus on the physical and
direct contact between the harasser and the victim, which makes the statute
ineffective when dealing with the cyber aspect of harassment.109 For instance,
applying Section 223(a)(1)(C) to a catfishing hoax or to a false Twitter account
prank would be difficult because the specific nature of those activities do not fit into
the statutory definition of harassment. It is important to note that the statute itself
inherently carries with it issues of vagueness, as well as First Amendment free
speech challenges.110
Since there is no federal statute regulating cyberharassment and there is no
current federal harassment law that adequately addresses the cyber aspect of
harassment, victims of the crime are forced to find a remedy through civil litigation.
111 The Megan Meier’s “MySpace Suicide Hoax” illustrates the consequences of not
having a specific statute penalizing cyberharassment.112 Megan was a thirteenyear-old girl who hanged herself due to a MySpace prank that was played on her by
her forty-seven year old neighbor, Lori Drew.113 Drew created a MySpace account
under the fictitious name Josh Evans with the intent to discover whether or not
Megan spread rumors about Drew’s daughter.114
During a two-hour time frame on the night she committed suicide, Megan
became a target of intense cyberharassment, analogous to a “teenage mob on the
Web.”115 The “mob” tormented Megan by calling her fat and a slut, as well as
spreading other rumors about her, and said that no one should befriend her. 116
Tragically, Megan ended her life that night, and without a federal statute
specifically criminalizing the cyberharassment she suffered. Thus, holding Drew
criminally responsible for her role in the suicide will likely be unsuccessful, leaving
civil litigation as Megan’s family’s sole remedy.117
Victims of cyberharassment can attempt to sue for defamation, invasion of
privacy, and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress, along with other torts.118
The voluntary nature of the Internet combined with the high burden the plaintiff
carries in presenting clear evidence proving the defendant’s state of mind to
Jameson, supra note 99, at 246.
WEIKERS , supra note 104.
111 Jameson, supra note 99, at 246.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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intentionally cause harm, makes it very difficult for a plaintiff to win on these
claims.119
Another major problem associated with cyberharassment is the anonymous
nature of the Internet, because too often the victim does not know the harasser’s
identity or is mistaken as to the true identity of the harasser.120 These victims may
try to find recourse through suing the ISP after reporting the cyberharassment to
the ISP under the CDA.121 ISP immunity, however, as previously discussed, is
incredibly broad and the standard of proof required to find one liable for a user’s
message is very high. This limits the options for cyberharassment victims and
leaves them ineffectively protected by the law.122 Failure to allow relief from ISPs
renders these plaintiffs without a remedy.
IV. THE 4TH QUARTER
The CDA, the DMCA, and the corresponding case law, appear to leave Te’o and
Gorforth without a remedy against the social media conglomerates, Facebook and
Twitter. It seems evident that Congress chose to legislate away any claim to
damages that would have been available to the two athletes. The harms that Te’o
and Goforth suffered are so pervasive and rapidly becoming commonplace in our
cyber-world that Congress must do something to address this inequity. This is the
type of conduct the CDA promised to protect against in its policy section, but
instead, Congress has only allowed this kind of cyber misconduct to flourish without
recourse.
Te’o and Goforth will have an incredibly difficult time establishing a successful
tort claim against Facebook and Twitter, respectively. Section 230 of the CDA
specifically states that ISPs will not be treated as the “publisher or speaker” for the
content of a third party.123 The act also prohibits civil liability in instances where
the service provider acted in good faith to remove or restrict access to materials
considered by the provider to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”124 The immunity afforded to
Facebook and Twitter by Section 230 of the CDA would appear to thwart a tort
claim brought forth by Te’o or Goforth on its face.
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Then, the Zeran decision expanded Section 230 ISP immunity so far as to make
recovery virtually impossible for Te’o and Goforth.125 The court held that instead of
having ISPs actively limit and restrict online speech in fear of being liable for its
content, “Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and
chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”126 In other
words, an ISP is not required to screen each of its millions of postings for possible
problems and is free from liability from such postings pursuant to the CDA.127 Even
if Te’o or Goforth could establish that there was “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” material that caused
them injury on either site, Facebook and Twitter are not obligated to screen for that
content and, therefore, cannot be held liable for its appearance on their networks. .
The DMCA, by way of Section 512, strengthens the weakness of Section 230 of
the CDA by offering ISPs “safe harbor” protection from monetary damages for
claims of copyright infringement.128 Finally, the court in Doe v. MySpace, extended
CDA and DCMA immunities to include social media sites, thus rendering Facebook
and Twitter seemingly impervious to tort liability for their users’ conduct. 129
Although it is likely that Te’o and Goforth would be precluded from successfully
suing the appropriate social media sites for tort liability, they could attempt to
bring a possible cyberharassment claim due to the nature and extent of their
victimization. While filing a cyberharassment claim is an option, it is likely that
both players would fail on that ground as well.
Te’o appears to have a stronger cyberharassment claim than does Goforth,
because Te’o can readily identify his alleged “harasser” as Ronaiah Tuiasosopo who
has accepted responsibility for the catfishing hoax.130 Pursuant to Section
223(a)(1)(C) of the federal cybercrime statute, it is a federal crime for anyone to use
the Internet "without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass any person…who receives the communications.”131 Applying this
statute to Tuiasosopo’s online activity, however, will be difficult to accomplish for a
few reasons. First, Tuiasosopo clearly did not reveal his true identity to Te’o, but he
did go to great lengths to assume a fictitious identity instead of remaining
anonymous. This is an important difference, because it lends insight into
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Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
127 Bluestone, supra note 62, at 582.
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Tuiasosopo’s mindset during the catfishing hoax, which is pivotal when trying to
interrupt his intent.
Second, it is unclear and nearly impossible to prove that Tuiasosopo’s intent was
to “annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass” Te’o given the bizarre nature of this case.132
People have speculated a variety of possible motives for Tuiasosopo, ranging from
him seeking the thrill of a successful publicized catfishing hoax, to a potential
financial payout from Te’o down the line.133 By all accounts, however, it is still
unclear as to what motivated Tuiasosopo’s behavior, assuming he was definitely the
architect behind the hoax.134 Tuiasosopo, in his interview with Dr. Phil, claimed
that pretending to be Lennay Kekua gave him an “escape” from his life and that he
developed “feelings” and “emotions” for Te’o that eventually Tuiasosopo “couldn’t
control anymore.”135
Based on Tuiasosopo’s account, which is difficult to rely on since he is an
admitted liar and hoaxer,136 his actions do not appear to meet the intent
requirement of Section 223(a)(1)(C) and proving otherwise will be challenging. Te’o’s
voluntary participation in the matter will not aid in establishing the intent
requirement of Section 223(a)(1)(C) either. Tuiasosopo clearly duped Te’o into
believing Kekua was an actual person, but the fact remains, Te’o was a willing
party in the relationship, which leads to the question, “how harassing was
Tuiasosopo’s behavior?”
Despite Te’o’s participation in the catfishing hoax, he was still injured by the
actions of Tuiasosopo. It seems likely, however, that Tuiasosopo’s actions will fall
outside the scope of Section 223(a)(1)(C) because the intent requirement cannot be
established. Thus, the current harassment laws do not seem equipped to
incriminate complex catfishing hoaxes.
The circumstances surrounding Goforth’s online impersonation seemingly
disqualify any potential cyberharassment claim he may have under Section
223(a)(1)(C). Even if Goforth could establish the intent burden of Section
223(a)(1)(C), he was not the person who “receive[d] the communications,” and was
therefore not the subject of any harassment himself, as the statute requires.137
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Furthermore, an anonymous individual committed the online impersonation. As
a result, Goforth’s cyberharassment claim would have to be brought against
Twitter, which is clearly immune from third party actions, under the immunities
provided to ISPs through the CDA and the DMCA. The extensive safeguarding
power afforded to the ISPs, coupled with the nonexistent federal statute that
directly addresses the specific nature of all the various new forms of
cyberharassment, leaves no available recourse for either Te’o or Goforth.
V. THE “HAIL MARY”
The evolving nature of the Internet creates new challenges in its regulation almost
on a daily basis. As a result of these challenges, the Legislature needs to create new
laws or amend the current ones so that ISPs can no longer hide behind blanket
immunity for all of their users’ behavior. However, given the legislative safeguard
protections enjoyed by the CDA and the DMCA, coupled with the courts’ apparent
stance that this type of Internet misconduct is not something that needs to be
protected, it is likely that nothing will change unless the CDA and the DMCA are
amended. Amending the CDA and the DMCA, however, is almost as unlikely as
completing a successful “Hail Mary” as time expires to win the Super Bowl;
meaning Te’o and Goforth will be left on the sidelines without a remedy.
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